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2I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Most legal challenges to school voucher programs have focused on the question whether 
a voucher program that permits the use of public funds in private religious schools constitutes an 
unconstitutional establishment of religion.1 In the wake of the Supreme Court’s 2002 decision in 
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris2 that such programs do not violate the First Amendment, the question 
remains whether they will be found to violate state constitutional provisions governing the 
relationship between church and state.  State constitutional challenges to voucher programs will 
not be limited to the issue of religious establishment, however. 
Although most state constitutions do prohibit state aid to religious institutions, many also 
include provisions governing other aspects of public education.  Of particular interest are 
provisions in the constitutions of fifteen states requiring some degree of uniformity among public 
schools.3 In the past, plaintiffs have used these “uniformity clauses” to justify challenges to state 
approaches to public school financing.  But voucher opponents are putting them to a different 
use, claiming that in offering families a diverse array of educational options, voucher programs 
sacrifice the required uniformity. 
A recent decision of the Florida Supreme Court illustrates the possibilities of this 
approach – and its perils.  In Bush v. Holmes, decided in January 2006, the court heard a 
challenge to the Opportunity Scholarship Program (OSP), a school voucher program permitting 
 
1 See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (a voucher program permitting 
parents to use vouchers in religious schools did not violate the federal Establishment Clause); 
Chittenden Town Sch. Dist. v. Dep’t of Educ., 738 A.2d 539 (Vt. 1999) (state reimbursement of 
parochial school tuition violated the state establishment clause); Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 
602 (Wis. 1998) (a voucher program permitting students to use vouchers in religious schools did 
not violate the federal Establishment Clause). 
2 536 U.S. 639 (2002). 
3 Andrew Coulson, War Against Vouchers, at
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=5363 (last visited Feb. 10, 2006).  See also 
Section IV.B, infra.
3the use of vouchers in religious schools.4 The plaintiffs claimed that the OSP violated not only 
Florida’s constitutional “no aid” clause, prohibiting state aid to religious institutions, but also its 
uniformity clause, requiring the state to maintain a “uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high 
quality system of free public schools.”5 In advance of the ruling, many observers expected the 
court to focus on the establishment question, which an intermediate appellate court had certified 
to it as one of “great public importance.”6 Instead, the high court struck down the OSP as a 
violation of Florida’s uniformity clause.7
Some voucher proponents accused the Holmes court of ducking the real issue.  Said an 
attorney with the Institute for Justice, a nonprofit organization that helped litigate the case for the 
defendants:  “[T]he opinion appears both nakedly political and specifically designed to avoid 
confronting the [religion] question.”8 Such criticisms missed the point, however.  The problem 
with Holmes v. Bush was not that the court passed on the religion question.  It was that, having 
addressed itself to the question of uniformity, the court offered an unsatisfactory answer. 
Whether a court measures a school voucher program against a ban on religious 
establishment or against a requirement for uniformity, the potential sticking point is the same:  
voucher programs provide public funds to private institutions whose purposes and practices may 
differ radically from those of public schools.  In either case, the court must evaluate whatever 
differences exist between publicly funded schools against the constitution’s insistence on 
 
4 919 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 2006) [hereinafter Holmes III]. 
5 FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (2005). 
6 Bush v. Holmes, 886 So. 2d 340 (Ct. App. Fla. 2004) [hereinafter Holmes II]. 
7 Holmes III, 919 So. 2d 392. 
8 Florida Supreme Court Strikes Down School Choice, Institute for Justice, Jan. 5, 2006, at
http://www.ij.org/schoolchoice/florida/1_5_06pr.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2006).  See also 
Jacquelyn Horkan, Justices Invalidate Scholarships for Children in Failing Schools, FLA.
CATHOLIC (2006), available at http://www.thefloridacatholic.org/articles/2006/060120/060120-
pt-noscholarships.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2006) (noting that “[t]he justices surprised many 
observers by declining to rule on whether the program violated Article I ….”). 
4uniformity.  But it cannot do so without first determining what “uniformity” means.  The fatal 
flaw in Bush v. Holmes is that the court neglected this essential task. 
Although the meaning of uniformity is neither obvious nor settled, clues exist as to its 
meaning.  Courts in other states have offered a variety of possible definitions, some arguing that 
uniformity means equal funding, others that it denotes equality of opportunity, and still others 
that it refers to the “character of instruction.”  These decisions, interpreting other uniformity 
clauses, do not indicate how the Florida court should have interpreted Florida’s constitutional 
language – but they do illustrate the range of possibilities.  More importantly, there is a small 
body of case law construing Florida’s own uniformity clause.  These cases suggest that the 
purpose of the clause is to ensure that all of Florida’s children have an equal opportunity to 
become enlightened citizens.  The history of Florida’s uniformity clause supports this 
interpretation, as well. 
Unfortunately, the Holmes court did not consult these potential sources of guidance.  
Instead, without articulating its reasoning, it opted for a simplistic, literal reading of the 
constitutional language, construing “uniformity” to require consistency among two of the most 
basic programmatic elements of schooling:  curriculum and teacher training.  Because the private 
schools funded under Florida’s voucher program differed from public schools in these two 
respects, the court struck the program down. 
A more sophisticated approach in the Holmes case would have produced a different 
vision of uniformity; it also would have produced a different outcome.  The statute does not 
appear to violate the uniformity clause, properly understood, on its face.  Moreover, although 
available empirical data on the OSP focus exclusively on how the program affected academic 
achievement, the evidence from research on school choice programs in other states suggests that 
5such programs may enhance, rather than diminishing, students’ opportunities to become 
enlightened citizens.  This Article does not insist that the Holmes court should have upheld the 
OSP over all state constitutional challenges.  It might, for example, have found the OSP in 
violation of the “no aid” clause, as the court below had suggested.  But a proper construction of 
the uniformity clause, and a look at the available evidence, indicate that the court’s decision to 
strike the program down as violating the constitutional requirement for uniformity was a mistake. 
Some voucher advocates have worried that Holmes is a bellwether – that, following the 
Florida court’s decision, courts in other states with uniformity clauses will strike down not only 
voucher programs, but also other forms of school choice, including charter schools.9 The 
potential significance of Holmes does appear to extend beyond Florida; of the fourteen other 
states with uniformity clauses, several offer school choice in one form or another, and these 
programs appear vulnerable to challenges like the one brought by the plaintiffs in Holmes.10 But 
if and when such challenges arise, the courts hearing them should look to Holmes as an example 
of what not to do. 
Instead of assuming simplistic, literal definitions of uniformity, as the Holmes court did, 
the courts in future cases should begin by acknowledging frankly the necessity of determining 
the meaning of uniformity.  Next, drawing on case law and historical evidence, they should 
fashion definitions of uniformity that accurately reflect the purposes for which their states’ 
 
9 See, e.g., Coulson, supra note 3. 
10 See, e.g., Carrie Lips, Arizona School Choice Plan Provides Model, at
http://www.cato.org/research/education/articles/arizona.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2006) 
(describing Arizona’s program of tax credits for families donating to a private school tuition 
fund); Colorado, Heritage Foundation, at 
http://www.heritage.org/research/education/schoolchoice/Colorado.cfm (last visited Apr. 17, 
2006) (describing school choice programs in Colorado); Milwaukee Parental Choice Program,
at http://www.schoolchoiceinfo.org/facts/index.cfm?fl_id=1 (last visited Apr. 17, 2006) 
(describing Milwaukee’s voucher program). 
6uniformity clauses were adopted.  Finally, in applying these definitions to the challenged 
programs, they should take account of relevant empirical data.  This Article does not generalize 
about the outcomes courts in other states might reach, if they followed this approach.  Nor does it 
express a normative judgment about what outcome state courts should reach, as a general matter, 
when applying uniformity clauses to school choice programs.  But it contends that the approach 
outlined here will produce outcomes more solidly grounded in historical, doctrinal, and empirical 
reality than the outcome reached by the Florida Supreme Court in Holmes.
In sum:  This Article presents Holmes as a cautionary tale, and suggests a superior 
approach for courts hearing future uniformity clause challenges to voucher programs and other 
school choice schemes.  Part II provides background, including a description of the Opportunity 
Scholarship Program, the procedural history of the Holmes case, and an account of the Florida 
Supreme Court’s decision.  Part III offers a critique of the three principal grounds offered for the 
Holmes court’s decision.  In concluding that the OSP violated the uniformity clause, this Part 
argues, the court committed three errors:  It failed to acknowledge the necessity of choosing a 
definition of uniformity; it failed to consult potentially useful sources of guidance in making its 
choice; and it chose a definition that reflects neither its own prior decisions nor Florida’s 
constitutional history.  Part IV traces the path the Holmes court should have taken.  It examines 
the language of the uniformity clause, and finds that it offers little guidance; it considers the 
variety of ways in which courts in other states have interpreted their uniformity clauses, and 
concludes that the term “uniform” has no settled or self-evident meaning in the context of public 
schools; it reviews the Florida cases construing uniformity, as well as historical evidence, in 
order to fashion a more defensible definition of uniformity; and it applies that definition to the 
statute itself and to relevant empirical data, finding that there was insufficient evidence to 
7conclude that the OSP violated the uniformity clause.  Part V concludes by arguing that courts 
hearing future uniformity clause challenges to voucher programs and other school choice 
schemes should eschew the Holmes court’s approach in favor of the one modeled in this Article. 
 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Opportunity Scholarship Program 
Florida Governor Jeb Bush signed the Opportunity Scholarship Program (OSP) into law 
in 1999 as part of that state’s “A+ Education Plan.”11 The program permitted students in failing 
public schools to transfer into better-performing public schools or into private schools.12 
Students had to apply to participate in the program, which never became very large; in 2004-
2005, its penultimate year, it enrolled only 763 students.13 The OSP served primarily minority 
students; of the students participating in 2004, fifty-seven percent were African American, and 
thirty-eight percent were Hispanic.14 Most participants enrolled in private schools with some 
sectarian orientation; of these, most were Catholic schools. 
Voucher funds were paid to parents, who were required to endorse their children’s 
scholarship checks directly to the school of their choice.  The amount of the voucher varied; the 
statute defined the maximum amount as “the base student allocation in the Florida Education 
Finance Program multiplied by the appropriate cost factor for the educational program that 
would have been provided for the student in the district school to which he or she was assigned, 
 
11 Opportunity Scholarship Program, Fla. Dep’t of Educ., at
https://www.floridaschoolchoice.org/Information/OSP/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2006). 
12 Id.  A school was judged to be failing if it received at least two “F” ratings under the state’s 
rating system over a four-year period. 
13 Id. 
14 Holmes III, 919 So. 2d 392, Brief of Black Alliance for Educational Options, at 3. 
8multiplied by the district cost differential.”15 An additional constraint on the voucher amount 
was that it was not permitted to exceed the normal tuition at the private school the student 
attended.16 
Once enrolled in the voucher program, a student could stay in the program until she 
graduated from high school, even if the school she had left behind later improved its 
performance and ceased to be a failing school.  There was one exception to this rule:  If an OSP 
student completed eighth grade, and her local public high school was not a failing school, she 
was expected to transfer back into the public system upon entering ninth grade.17 
Both secular and sectarian private schools could participate in the OSP, as long as they 
met statutory criteria.  Among other requirements, these included:  1) fiscal soundness; 2) 
compliance with federal antidiscrimination law; 3) compliance with state laws governing private 
schools, including all applicable health and safety codes; 4) admission of students at random and 
without regard to religion; 5) agreement not to compel religious belief or practice by students; 6) 
acceptance of state vouchers as full payment of tuition and fees; and 7) successful completion of 
a private school accreditation process.18 
B. The Lawsuit 
One day after Governor Bush signed the OSP into law, a group of students, parents, and 
school employees sued to shut it down.  They claimed that the OSP violated the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, as well as three provisions of the 
 
15 FLA. STAT. § 1002.38(6) (2005). 
16 Holmes III, 919 So. 2d at 424 (Bell, J., dissenting) (citing Cost and Fiscal Impact, School 
Choice Wisconsin, at http://www.schoolchoiceinfo.org/facts/index.cfm?fpt_id=7&fl _id=3 (last 
visited Mar. 15, 2006). 
17 Id. at 401. 
18 FLA. STAT. § 1002.38(4) (2005). 
9Florida Constitution:  1) Article I, Section 3, the “no aid” clause, prohibiting the state from 
aiding religious institutions; 2) Article IX, Section 1, requiring the state to provide for a 
“uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high quality system of free public schools”; and 3) Article 
IX, Section 6, requiring that the State School Fund be used only to support public schools.19 
Over more than six years, the case seesawed confusingly between the plaintiffs’ claims.  
The trial court first struck down the OSP as violating the state constitution’s education article; 
this decision was overturned by an intermediate appellate court.20 While the case was pending 
on remand, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Zelman,21 and the plaintiffs withdrew their First 
Amendment claim.  On remand, the trial court found that the OSP violated the Florida 
constitution’s “no aid” provision, and the intermediate appellate court, sitting en banc, 
affirmed.22 Finally, the Florida Supreme Court found that the OSP violated the education article, 
just as the trial court had done six years before, and declined to rule on the “no aid” question.23 
C. The Decision 
The Holmes court offered three principal grounds for its conclusion that the OSP violated 
Article IX.  It began with an exercise in straightforward statutory construction.  On the basis of 
this exercise, it held that Section 1 of Article IX was “a mandate with a restriction.”  It required 
the state to educate its children by establishing public schools, and not by any other means.  The 
court focused on the following language: 
 
19 This claim turned out to be of little significance, since the OSP was funded from other state 
sources. 
20 Bush v. Holmes, 767 So. 2d 668 [hereinafter Holmes I]. 
21 536 U.S. 639. 
22 Holmes II, 886 So. 2d 340. 
23 Holmes III, 919 So. 2d 392. 
10 
The education of children is a fundamental value of the people of the State of 
Florida.  It is, therefore, a paramount duty of the state to make adequate provision 
for the education of all children residing within its borders.  Adequate provision 
shall be made by law for a uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high quality 
system of free public schools that allows students to obtain a high quality 
education and for the establishment, maintenance, and operation of institutions of 
higher learning and other public education programs that the needs of the people 
may require.24 
The court argued that the second and third sentences of this section had to be read in pari 
materia – in other words, that the constitution required the state to discharge its “paramount 
duty” by providing for a system of “free public schools.”25 The court also reached the same 
conclusion by applying another maxim:  expressio unius est exclusio alterius, or “the expression 
of one thing implies the exclusion of another.” 26 The constitution directed the state to educate 
its children by means of a system of free public schools, the court said, and not by any other 
means.  In creating the OSP, the state had sought to discharge its duty by a means not 
constitutionally authorized – and thus impermissible. 
Next, the court concluded that the OSP undermined the public school system by diverting 
funds to private schools, and in this way preventing the state from fulfilling its duty under Article 
IX:  “[T]he OSP does not supplement the public education system.  Instead, the OSP diverts 
funds that would otherwise be provided to the system of free public schools that is the exclusive 
means set out in the Constitution for the Legislature to make adequate provision for the 
education of children.”27 The majority acknowledged the dissent’s argument that the reduction 
in funds was not “dollar for dollar,” since the tuition charged by some participating private 
schools (and thus the amount of the vouchers received by students attending those schools) was 
 
24 FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a) (2005). 
25 Holmes III, 919 So. 2d at 406-07. 
26 Id. at 407-408. 
27 Id. at 408-09. 
11 
lower than the district’s per pupil expenditure – but it said that this distinction was “of no 
significance.”28 The court also rejected the suggestion that because the diversion of funds from 
the public schools was small, it was tolerable:  “The systematic diversion of public funds to 
private schools on either a small or large scale is incompatible with article IX, section 1(a).”29 
Finally, the court argued that the OSP violated Article IX’s “uniformity clause” by 
permitting the state to fund private schools that were not subject to the basic programmatic 
requirements governing the state’s public schools:  “The OSP makes no provision to ensure that 
the private school alternative to the public school meets the criterion of uniformity.”30 The court 
noted that private schools were not subject to the same level of state oversight as were public 
schools:  “[I]n a provision directing the Department of Education to establish and maintain a 
database of private schools, the Legislature expressly states that it does not intend ‘to regulate, 
control, approve, or accredit private educational institutions.’”31 The court also identified two 
specific programmatic elements in which consistency between public and private schools was 
not required:  teacher qualifications and curriculum.  First, teachers in private schools, unlike 
public school teachers, were not required to have bachelor’s degrees, to be credentialed by the 
state, or to undergo background screening.  Second, private schools were not required to abide by 
Florida’s curriculum guidelines, the “Sunshine State Standards,” which required public schools 
to teach “all basic subjects as well as a number of other diverse subjects, among them the 
contents of the Declaration of Independence, the essentials of the United States Constitution, the 
elements of civil government, Florida state history, African-American history, the history of the 
 
28 Id. at 409. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 1002.42(2)(h) (2005)). 
12 
Holocaust, and the study of Hispanic and women’s contributions to the United States.”32 
Accompanying the majority opinion was a dissent authored by Justice Kenneth Bell.  
Justice Bell concentrated on the majority’s claim that the language of the constitution revealed 
the OSP’s impermissibility.  In his view, the meaning of Section 1 was “plain and 
unambiguous,” and “need[ed] no interpretation.”33 He argued that the plain meaning of the 
section was not that the legislature was precluded from providing for the education of Florida’s 
children by means other than establishing public schools:  “There is no language of exclusion in 
the text.”34 And even if the text was ambiguous, Justice Bell maintained, the legislative history 
of Section 1 indicated that its drafters did not intend to make public schools the exclusive means 
by which the legislature could fulfill Article IX:  “[T]his history provides no support for the 
majority’s implied exclusivity.”35 
Justice Bell also took exception to the majority’s invocation of traditional maxims of 
statutory construction.  In particular, he objected to the use of expressio unius, which he argued 
was applicable only in rare circumstances, and not here:  “We have repeatedly refused to apply 
this maxim in situations where the statute at issue bore a ‘real relation to the subject and object’ 
of the constitutional provision … or did not violate the primary purpose behind the constitutional 
provision.  The majority’s use of this maxim violates both restrictions.”36 
Finally, Justice Bell offered a brief objection to the second ground offered by the 
majority:  that the OSP was undermining public schools by diverting funds.  He did not disagree 
that it would be unconstitutional for the state to sabotage its own schools.  Instead, he 
 
32 Id. at 410 (citing FLA. STAT. § 1003.42(2)(a) (2005)). 
33 Id. at 413 (Bell, J., dissenting). 
34 Id. at 415. 
35 Id. at 417. 
36 Id. at 421 (citations omitted). 
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complained that the plaintiffs had offered no evidence to show that the state was doing any such 
thing:  “[T]here is absolutely no evidence that the OSP prevents the Legislature from making 
adequate provision for a public school system.”37 Indeed, he argued, “the purpose behind the 
program was to improve the public school system by increasing accountability in education.”38 
III. A CRITIQUE 
This Part identifies flaws in each of the three grounds on which the Holmes court based 
its decision.  It briefly treats the first and second grounds, which refer to the constitutional 
section that contains the uniformity clause, but rely on other language in that section.  Then it 
discusses the third ground, the court’s conclusion that the OSP violated the uniformity clause.  In 
reaching this conclusion, this Part argues, the court committed three errors:  1) it failed to 
acknowledge the necessity of choosing a definition of uniformity from among the possible 
alternatives; 2) it neglected to consult available guidance in selecting its definition; and 3) it 
selected a definition that was inconsistent with its own precedents and with the history of the 
uniformity clause. 
 
A. Ground One:  “A Mandate With a Restriction” 
Although Justice Bell’s dissent in Holmes offers a thorough critique of the majority’s 
exercise in statutory construction, it nowhere raises an obvious objection:  that the majority does 
not permit its interpretation of Section 1 to stand alone.  If the majority’s interpretation is correct, 
then the OSP violates the constitution, and no more need be said.  So why does the majority offer 
two additional grounds for its decision?  If public schools are the exclusive means by which the 
 
37 Id. at 424. 
38 Id. 
14 
state may educate its children, then claims that the OSP diverts funds from the public schools, or 
permits programmatic non-uniformity, are surplusage.  The court’s decision to supplement its 
analysis looks especially strange when one considers that in offering its second and third 
grounds, it forced itself to weigh difficult empirical questions:  whether voucher programs 
undermine or improve the performance of public schools by diverting funds, and whether 
voucher programs create an undesirable absence of uniformity among schools by allowing for 
programmatic diversity.  Why would it have done this? 
Perhaps the court was just hedging its bets.  Or perhaps it intended to offer guidance to 
the legislature – to suggest that a voucher program might be constitutional if it did not divert 
funds from the public schools, or sacrifice programmatic uniformity.  Perhaps it meant that a 
privately funded voucher program – or, better yet, a privately funded voucher program with strict 
controls on the programmatic choices available to participating schools – would have been 
acceptable.  In the end, though, the court’s decision to supplement its exercise in statutory 
construction suggests a lack of confidence in its own reasoning, and diminishes the persuasive 
power of its opinion. 
 
B. Ground Two:  Diversion of Funds 
Justice Bell also criticized the Holmes majority’s second ground:  that the OSP diverted 
funds from the public schools, preventing the state from discharging its constitutional duty.  As 
Justice Bell observed, the majority cited no evidence that the diversion had injured the public 
schools.  Instead, having pointed out the diversion, it appeared to conclude that injury was 
inevitable. 
15 
 Justice Bell’s criticism is compelling.  It is far from self-evident that any diversion of 
funds damages the public schools.  Rather, whether voucher programs help or hurt public schools 
is a complicated empirical question.  One problem with the majority’s claim is that the funds 
forfeited by failing schools may be less than the cost of educating those students.  As Justice Bell 
points out, the average tuition at voucher schools (and thus the average maximum allowable 
voucher amount) was lower than the average per-pupil expenditure at public schools.39 In fact, 
state data suggest that over the first four years of the OSP, it resulted in a net savings to the state 
of more than $37,000.40 
Moreover, school finance is a dynamic system.  A school’s per-pupil cost is not 
distributed evenly among all students, since the marginal cost of educating each additional 
student decreases as the number of students enrolled increases.  The last student to arrive 
accounts for a disproportionately small portion of the school’s total costs – and so does the first 
student to leave.  Whether a voucher program hurts public schools hinges on the relationship 
between the voucher deduction and the actual marginal cost of educating the students who use 
vouchers.  It may be that a more careful calculation would have cut against the OSP, since the 
number of voucher students was small, and if only a few students left the system, it stands to 
reason that no student left whose marginal cost was high.  Still, it is hard to excuse the court’s 
failure to assess the OSP’s cost in a more sophisticated way. 
The dissent also remarks on another problem:  nowhere does the majority address the 
claim that, far from undermining public schools, vouchers actually improve public schools by 
fostering competition.  Some supporters of the OSP offered this claim.  Even several months 
 
39 Id. at 424 (Bell, J., dissenting). 
40 Cost and Fiscal Impact, SchoolChoiceInfo.org (2002) at
http://www.schoolchoiceinfo.org/facts/index.cfm?fpt_id=7&fl_id=3 (last visited Mar. 30, 2006). 
16 
after the OSP’s demise, a state website continued to maintain that “Opportunity Scholarships will 
help improve public schools – they are designed to help kids in chronically failing schools get a 
quality education, while simultaneously providing an incentive for all schools to improve.”41 
Likewise, in a critique of the Holmes decision, University of Chicago law professor Richard 
Epstein suggested that where a program like the OSP exists, “[t]he public school teachers and 
their unions … realize that they are in competition with … versatile institutions that they cannot 
control …. The only way they can maintain their market share is to provide, as the Florida 
Constitution requires, a high quality education in an efficient fashion.”42 
The empirical data are less conclusive.  In a well-known 2001 study, for example, 
Harvard economist Caroline Hoxby examined the effects on public school “productivity” 
(defined as achievement per dollar spent) of three school choice regimes, including Milwaukee’s 
school voucher program, and concluded that “[i]n each case … regular public schools boosted 
their productivity when exposed to competition.”43 On the other side is economist Martin 
Carnoy of Stanford, who has warned, based on his examination of long-running voucher 
programs in New Zealand and Chile, that “there is tremendous risk in relying on vouchers to 
improve low-performing public schools. … The danger is that the public schools become 
 
41 Opportunity Scholarships, Florida Governor’s Office, at
http://www.myflorida.com/myflorida/government/governorinitiatives/aplusplan/opportunityScho
larships.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2006). 
42 Richard Epstein, Vouchers Fall in the Florida Supreme Court, Jan. 16, 2006, available at 
http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2006/01/vouchers_fall_i.html#more (last visited Mar. 
20, 2006). 
43 CAROLINE M. HOXBY, SCHOOL CHOICE AND SCHOOL PRODUCTIVITY (OR COULD SCHOOL 
CHOICE BE A TIDE THAT LIFTS ALL BOATS?) 50 (2001), available at 
http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/hoxby/papers/school_choice.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 
2006). 
17 
identified even more as ‘losers’ than they were before vouchers were introduced. … [I]ncentives 
for public schools to improve may decline instead of increase.”44 
There have been empirical studies of the effect of the OSP itself on public schools.  
These, too, cut both ways.  In one study, Jay Greene of the Manhattan Institute found that 
“Florida’s low-performing schools are improving in direct proportion to the challenge they face 
from voucher competition.”45 But a later study by David Figlio and Cecilia Rouse reached the 
opposite conclusion:  “We … conclude that the successes of the school accountability system in 
improving student test scores in the lowest performing schools were likely more due to the other 
attributes of the school accountability system … than they were due to the threat of school 
vouchers.”46 
That the court was unaware of the debate over the effect of vouchers on public schools is 
implausible.  In its amicus brief in support of the OSP, the nonprofit Independent Voices for 
Better Education (IVBE) argued that “when the Florida Legislature adopted the Scholarship 
Program, it was not seeking to advance religion, but rather was making a good-faith effort to 
improve the public welfare by fulfilling the command of the citizens to greatly improve the 
quality of education in the state.”47 IVBE cited research purporting to show that voucher 
 
44 Martin Conroy, Should States Implement Vouchers Even If They Are Constitutional?, in 
School Vouchers:  Settled Questions, Continuing Disputes 32-33, The Pew Forum on Religion 
and Public Life, November 2002, available at 
http://pewforum.org/issues/files/VoucherPackage.pdf (last visited Mar. 20, 2006). 
45 JAY P. GREENE & MARCUS A. WINTERS, WHEN SCHOOLS COMPETE: THE EFFECTS OF 
VOUCHERS ON FLORIDA PUBLIC SCHOOL ACHIEVEMENT (2003), available at 
http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/ewp_02.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2006). 
46 David N. Figlio & Cecilia Elena Rouse, Do Accountability and Voucher Threats Improve Low-
Performing Schools? 6, NBER Working Paper No. 11597, Aug. 2005, available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w11597 (last visited Mar. 20, 2006). 
47 Holmes III, 929 So. 2d 392, Brief of Independent Voices for Better Education at 16. 
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programs had raised the performance of public schools,48 and cited Jay Greene’s study, 
mentioned above.49 On the other side, the National Parent-Teacher Association (NPTA) argued 
that “defendants’ amici are wrong when they say that voucher programs ‘do no harm’ to students 
who remain in public schools.  Voucher programs do incalculable harm by diverting from public 
to private schools the resources that are necessary to implement programs that have proven to be 
effective ….”50 The NPTA also dismissed Jay Greene’s findings as “largely discredited.”51 
In sum, the court’s legal conclusion is incontrovertible – Article IX of the Florida 
constitution does indeed prohibit the state from destroying its own school system – but in 
applying the law to the facts, the court stumbled.  It failed to reckon in a sophisticated way with 
the question of the actual cost to public schools of the OSP, and it ignored the possibility that the 
OSP might improve Florida’s public schools. 
 
C. Ground Three:  Uniformity 
Although Justice Bell advanced a sharp critique of the court’s reasoning in Holmes, he
overlooked the most significant flaw in the majority opinion:  the weakness of its third ground.  
As noted above, the court’s third reason for striking down the OSP was its conclusion that the 
 
48 Id. at 17-18 (citing JOHN GARDNER, HOW SCHOOL CHOICE HELPS THE MILWAUKEE PUBLIC 
SCHOOLS i (2002), available at http://www.schoolchoiceinfo.org/data/research/GardnerMPS.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 20, 2006); PAUL E. PETERSON ET AL., AN EVALUATION OF THE CLEVELAND 
VOUCHER PROGRAM AFTER TWO YEARS 10 (1999)). 
49 Id. at 18-19 (citing JAY P. GREENE & MARCUS A. WINTERS, WHEN SCHOOLS COMPETE: THE 
EFFECTS OF VOUCHERS ON FLORIDA PUBLIC SCHOOL ACHIEVEMENT (2003), available at 
http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/ewp_02.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2006)). 
50 Holmes III, 929 So. 2d 392, Brief for the National PTA at 20. 
51 Id. at 14-18 (citing, inter alia, Gregory Camilli & Katrina Bulkley, Critique of ‘An Evaluation 
of the Florida A-Plus Accountability and School Choice Program’, EDUC. POL’Y ANALYSIS 
ARCHIVES 9:7 (2001)). 
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voucher program violated the Florida constitution’s uniformity clause.  The court committed 
three related errors in reaching this conclusion. 
First, the Holmes court failed to acknowledge that in interpreting the uniformity clause, it 
was choosing from among a variety of interpretive options.  Its analysis, already sketched above, 
proceeded in this way:  Having observed that the constitution required uniformity among public 
schools, the court pointed out that private schools were not subject to state regulation or to 
Florida’s accreditation regime.  Then it listed two programmatic requirements to which the 
private schools participating in the OSP were not subject:  Private schools were not required to 
hire state-certified teachers possessing bachelor’s degrees, and they were not bound by the state 
curriculum guidelines.  On this basis, the court concluded:  “In all these respects, the alternative 
system of private schools funded by the OSP cannot be deemed uniform in accordance with the 
mandate in article IX, section 1(a).”52 
In deciding to apply the uniformity clause, the Holmes court undertook what should have 
been a challenging task.  As noted above, the meaning of uniformity is not self-evident.  Other 
judicial pronouncements on the meaning of state uniformity clauses reflect a broad range of 
possible interpretations, suggesting that such a clause may refer to funding, opportunity, access, 
character of instruction, one or more programmatic elements, or the values underlying 
instruction.53 In order to apply the constitutional requirement, the Holmes court had to settle on 
one species of uniformity from among all these choices.  It did so almost without explanation, 
choosing a narrow, programmatic species.  But its application of this programmatic idea of 
uniformity to the OSP was not automatic or foreordained; it was a choice.  The court should have 
acknowledged as much. 
 
52 Holmes III, 919 So. 2d at 410. 
53 See Section IV.B, infra.
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Second, in choosing a definition of uniformity, the Holmes court neglected to consult the 
many sources of guidance available to it.  Although, elsewhere in its opinion, it had engaged in a 
textual analysis of the constitutional requirement that the state maintain a system of free public 
schools, it declined to muster a similar effort to interpret the requirement that that system be 
uniform.  Although several of its prior cases offered discussions of the uniformity clause, it 
ignored those precedents.  And although it had described the legislative history of Florida’s 
constitutional education article, it failed to mine this history for clues as the meaning of the 
uniformity requirement.  Explicitly consulting these sources would have permitted the court to 
render a more sensible decision; it should have done so. 
The third problem with the Holmes court’s analysis flowed almost inevitably from the 
second:  The court’s cramped, simplistic definition of uniformity, unmoored from all possible 
sources of guidance, is impossible to justify on any terms.  It fails to incorporate the wisdom of 
other state courts’ opinions on the subject of uniformity, represents an inexplicable break from 
the court’s own precedents, and finds little support in Florida’s history.  Had the court analyzed 
the meaning of the uniformity clause more thoughtfully, it would not have settled on a narrow 
programmatic vision of uniformity, but instead would have construed the constitutional language 
as requiring uniformity of a more substantive nature. 
In the end, because it adopted an indefensibly simplistic definition of uniformity, the 
court reached the wrong result.  If it had developed a more thoughtful definition, and applied this 
definition to the available empirical data on voucher programs and citizenship education, it 
would have found that the OSP did not, after all, violate the constitutional uniformity 
requirement.  This is not to say that the court could not have struck down the OSP for some other 
reason.  But it should not have reached the result it did on uniformity clause grounds. 
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IV. A SUPERIOR MODEL 
 This Part illustrates a superior approach to the application of a state constitutional 
uniformity clause to a school voucher program by tracing the path the Holmes court should have 
taken in applying Florida’s uniformity clause to the OSP.  First, this Part examines the text of the 
uniformity clause.  In this case, the plain language of the text would not have helped the court 
determine the meaning of uniformity – but its ambiguity should have alerted the court to the need 
to engage in an explicit analysis of the uniformity clause, rather than simply assuming its 
meaning.  Second, this Part considers the ways in which courts in several other states have 
interpreted constitutional uniformity clauses.  These decisions confirm that the meaning of 
uniformity is hotly debated, and support the contention that the Holmes court should have 
offered a thoughtful discussion of the alternatives.  Third, this Part examines prior cases in which 
the Florida Supreme Court itself has construed uniformity.  These cases suggest that Florida’s 
uniformity clause refers, not to programmatic uniformity, but to the necessity of preparing 
students equally for enlightened citizenship in a democracy.  Fourth, this Part consults Florida’s 
constitutional history, and finds additional support for the proposition that the intent of the 
uniformity clause is to foster citizenship.  Finally, this Part applies its proposed interpretation of 
Florida’s uniformity clause to the statute authorizing the OSP, to the evidence about the OSP’s 
performance, and to available empirical data bearing on school choice programs generally.  
Based on this analysis, this Part disputes the Holmes court’s judgment that the OSP violated the 
uniformity clause. 
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A. Text 
 A logical place for the Holmes court to start, in interpreting the uniformity clause, would 
have been the text of the clause itself.  It is hornbook law that “the meaning of a statute must, in 
the first instance, be sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if that is plain … the 
sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.”54 The Holmes court’s 
application of the in pari materia and expressio unius principles, discussed above, demonstrated 
that it was not averse to textual interpretation.  Indeed, the Florida Supreme Court has stated, in 
another case, that “[t]he words and terms of a Constitution are to be interpreted in their most 
usual and obvious meaning, unless the text suggests that they have been used in a technical 
sense.”55 
What result, if the Holmes court had chosen this approach?  As noted above, Section 1 of 
Article IX requires the state of Florida to provide for a “uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high 
quality system of free public schools.”56 Justice Bell, in his dissent in Holmes, claimed that the 
meaning of this language was clear:  “The text of article IX, section 1 is plain and 
unambiguous.”57 If Justice Bell were correct, and the word “uniform,” in this context, had a 
single, incontrovertible, and easily apprehensible meaning, then the court would have been 
required simply to apply that meaning to the facts of the case. 
But Justice Bell was incorrect, at least as to the meaning of the word “uniform.”  
Webster’s dictionary, commonly consulted by Florida courts,58 indicates that uniform may mean 
 
54 Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917). 
55 Jacksonville v. Continental Can Co., 151 So. 488, 490-91 (1933). 
56 FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 1(a) (2006). 
57 Holmes III, 919 So. 2d at 413 (Bell, J., dissenting). 
58 Jon Mills & Timothy McLendon, Setting a New Standard for Public Education:  Revision 6 
Increases the Duty of the State to Make “Adequate Provision” for Florida Schools, 52 FLA. L. 
REV. 329, 368 (2000). 
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not only “marked by lack of variation, diversity, change in form, manner, worth, or degree,” but 
also “marked by complete conformity to a rule or pattern or by similarity in salient detail or 
practice,” and “marked by varied and changeless appearance,” as well as “consistent in conduct, 
character, or effect.”59 Apply even one of these definitions to public schools and myriad 
possibilities at once appear.  Take the last of them:  “consistent in conduct, character, or effect.”  
If the uniformity clause were based on this definition, what would it require?  Would it demand 
that the conduct of public schools be equal, or that they all have the same character, or that they 
produce equal effects?  And if one says, arbitrarily, the last of these, one still must determine 
how the effects of public schools should be measured.  What effects are most significant, from 
the point of view of the constitution?  Graduation rates?  Test scores?  Student satisfaction? 
Because the word “uniform” does not offer a “plain and unambiguous” meaning, textual 
analysis is of little use here.  Robert Post observes:  “[I]f for any reason [the constitutional] 
meaning has become questionable, it is no help at all to instruct a judge to follow the ‘plain 
meaning’ of the constitutional text.  A meaning that has ceased to be plain cannot be made so by 
sheer force of will.”60 Thus, even if the Holmes court had made a serious attempt to analyze the 
text of the uniformity clause, the attempt would have been futile.  Fortunately, other interpretive 
methods were available. 
 
B. Cases:  Other States 
The Holmes court’s decision not to consult prior cases in construing the uniformity clause 
is difficult to fathom.  Robert Post has observed that “[t]he vast majority of constitutional 
 
59 WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INT’L DICT. (UNABRIDGED) (1993). 
60 Robert Post, Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, 30 REPRESENTATIONS 13, 14 (1990). 
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decisions rely primarily upon doctrinal interpretation.”61 Philip Bobbitt, in his typology of the 
modalities of constitutional interpretation, suggests a hypothetical not unlike Holmes: “[T]o 
what extent can a state constitutionally aid parochial schools?”62 Then he suggests the approach 
a court confronting this question would be most likely to take:  “A judge confronting such a case 
would probably begin … by turning to precedent to find similar cases in which authoritative 
decisions would govern the present one.”63 Not only is doctrinal analysis standard procedure in 
cases like Holmes, it might have reminded the court that its first order of business, in applying 
the uniformity clause, should have been to announce the necessity of choosing from among a 
wide range of possible definitions. 
At least fourteen states other than Florida have constitutional provisions requiring 
uniformity in public education.64 Many of these states’ education articles contain language 
similar to Florida’s Article IX, advancing demands for uniformity while saying little or nothing 
about what uniformity means.  The Arizona constitution, for example, requires the state 
legislature to “enact such laws as shall provide for the establishment and maintenance of a 
general and uniform public school system.”65 The Wisconsin constitution requires “the 
establishment of district schools, which shall be as nearly uniform as practicable.”66 And the 
 
61 Id. at 20. 
62 PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION [no pagination available] (1991). 
63 Id. 
64 Coulson, supra note 3.  Even in some states whose constitutions lack express requirements for 
uniformity, courts have inferred such requirements.  One such state is Kentucky, whose 
constitution calls for “an efficient system of common schools throughout the state.”  KY. CONST.
§ 183 (2005).  The Kentucky Supreme Court has interpreted this language to mean that “[p]ublic 
schools must be efficient, equal, and substantially uniform.” Rose, 790 S.W.2d 186 (finding that 
Kentucky’s system of public school financing violated the state constitutional requirement for 
efficiency). 
65 ARIZ. CONST. art. XI, § 1 (2006). 
66 WISC. CONST. art. X, § 3 (2005). 
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North Carolina constitution calls for “a general and uniform system of free public schools.”67 
Similar requirements appear in the constitutions of Colorado (“a thorough and uniform system of 
free public schools throughout the state”);68 Oregon (“A uniform, and general system of 
Common schools”);69 Idaho (“a general, uniform and thorough system of public, free common 
schools”);70 and North Dakota (“a uniform system of free public schools throughout the state”).71 
The case law in other states reflects agreement only on one point:   Constitutional 
uniformity clauses do not mean that all public schools must be identical.  In North Carolina, for 
example, the state supreme court has observed that its uniformity clause “does not require every 
school within every county or throughout the State to be identical in all respects.” 72 The court 
reasoned that “[s]uch a mandate would be impossible to carry out as there are differences within 
a given school as the caliber of teachers and students differ.”73 The supreme court of Arizona, in 
weighing a claim that Arizona’s system of school finance violated its constitutional uniformity 
clause, reviewed dozens of cases in which other state courts had considered similar claims, and 
concluded that as a general matter, “units in ‘general and uniform’ state systems need not be 
exactly the same, identical, or equal.”74 
On other questions, the case law in other states reflects sharp disagreement.  For example, 
state courts disagree about whether constitutional uniformity provisions require equal funding for 
 
67 N.C. CONST. art. IX, § 2 (2005). 
68 COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 2 (2005). 
69 ORE. CONST. art. VIII, § 3 (2003). 
70 IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 1 (2006). 
71 N.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 2 (2005). 
72 Kiddie Korner Day Schs., Inc. v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. Of Educ., 285 S.E.2d 110 (N.C. 
1981) (holding that a school district’s extended day program did not violate North Carolina’s 
state constitutional uniformity clause). 
73 Id.
74 Roosevelt Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 66 v. Bishop, 877 P.2d 806, 814 (Ariz. 1994) (finding that 
Arizona’s system of school finance violated its state constitutional uniformity clause). 
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public schools.  The supreme court of Arizona cited that state’s uniformity clause in striking 
down a school financing scheme that had produced financial disparities among school districts:  
“Because the state’s financing system is itself the cause of these disparities, the system, taken as 
a whole, does not comply with … the constitutional mandate of a general and uniform school 
system.”75 But the supreme court of Wisconsin, in a similar case, reached the opposite result:  
“[T]he uniformity clause … does not require absolute uniformity in either educational offerings 
or per-pupil expenditures among school districts.”76 Likewise, Colorado’s supreme court has 
held that “the requirement of a ‘thorough and uniform system of free public schools’ does not 
require that educational expenditures per pupil in every school district be identical.”77 
Although most plaintiffs invoking state uniformity clauses have sought to measure 
uniformity in terms of the funding available to school districts, the cases reflect a variety of other 
metrics.  The supreme court of North Dakota, in striking down that state’s school finance system 
as violating its uniformity provision, observed:  “Because educational opportunities are not 
substantially uniform, the existing system of educational funding needs fixing.”78 The supreme 
court of North Carolina, by contrast, has declined to focus on opportunity:  “There is no 
requirement that [the state] provide identical opportunities to each and every student.”79 Instead, 
reading that state’s uniformity clause in conjunction with its constitutional requirement that 
“equal opportunities shall be provided for all students,” the North Carolina court has emphasized 
access: “The fundamental right guaranteed by our Constitution … is to equal access to our 
 
75 Roosevelt Elem. Sch. Dist. No. 66, 877 P.2d at 815-16. 
76 Vincent v. Voight, 614 N.W.2d 388, 411 (Wisc. 2000) (finding that Wisconsin’s school 
financing system did not violate its state constitutional uniformity clause). 
77 Lujan v. State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1023 (Colo. 1982) (holding that Colorado’s 
system of school financing did not violate its state constitutional uniformity clause). 
78 Bismarck Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 511 N.W.2d at 262. 
79 Kiddie Korner, 285 S.E.2d at 113. 
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public schools ….”80 The supreme court of Wisconsin, adopting another approach, has 
construed that state’s uniformity clause to require that the character of instruction offered in 
Wisconsin’s public schools be uniform:  “This court has stated on several occasions that the 
requirement of uniformity ‘applies to the … “character of instruction” given ….’”81 The court 
has construed “character of instruction” to include a variety of programmatic elements, including 
“minimum standards for teacher certification, minimal number of school days, and standard 
school curriculum.”82 Endorsing yet another approach, a Wisconsin Supreme Court justice 
dissenting in another case argued that “character of instruction” referred, not to programmatic 
elements, but to the values underlying instruction:  “[The uniformity clause] requires the 
legislature to ensure that all Wisconsin children who receive basic education through public 
funding receive a uniform education reflecting the shared values of our state.”83 Finally, the 
supreme court of Idaho has focused on the narrow issue of curriculum: “We continue to believe 
the uniformity requirement in the education clause requires only uniformity in curriculum, not 
uniformity in funding.”84 
Courts in other states have grappled not only with the meaning of uniformity, but also 
with the range of institutions to which state constitutional uniformity clauses should apply.  On 
point is Davis v. Grover,85 cited above, in which the Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected a 
challenge to the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program (MPCP), under which parents were 
 
80 Britt v. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 357 S.E.2d 432, 436 (N.C. 1987) (citing N.C. 
CONST. art. IX, § 2 (2006)) (emphasis deleted). 
81 Davis v. Grover, 480 N.W.2d 460, 473 (Wisc. 1992) (quoting Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 
568 (Wisc. 1989) (quoting State ex rel. Zilisch v. Auer, 223 N.W. 123 (Wisc. 1928))). 
82 Kukor, 436 N.W.2d at 492-93. 
83 Id. 
84 Idaho Schs. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. Idaho State Bd. of Educ., 850 P.2d 724, 728 
(Idaho 1993). 
85 480 N.W.2d 460. 
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permitted to use publicly funded vouchers in nonsectarian private schools.86 The plaintiffs in 
Davis alleged that the MPCP violated Wisconsin’s uniformity clause, which declares:  “The 
legislature shall provide by law for the establishment of district schools, which shall be as nearly 
uniform as practicable ….”87 But the court found it unnecessary to consider whether the 
participation of private schools in the MPCP violated this language.  Instead, it simply held that 
the uniformity clause did not apply to those schools:  “We hold that the MPCP does not violate 
art. X, sec. 3 of the Wisconsin Constitution because the participating private schools do not 
constitute ‘district schools,’ even though they receive some public monies to educate students 
participating in the program.”88 
As this discussion illustrates, courts in other states with uniformity clauses have 
interpreted them in a wide variety of ways.  Although it appears that most state courts have 
construed their uniformity clauses not to require that all schools be absolutely identical, they 
have measured uniformity in many different ways, some looking to opportunity, others to access, 
others to “character of instruction,” others to the values underlying instruction, and still others to 
curriculum alone.  And some courts have grappled not only with the meaning of state 
constitutional uniformity clauses, but also with the range of institutions to which those clauses 
should apply.  A review of these cases would have alerted the Holmes court to the insufficiency 
of simply assuming the meaning and applicability of Florida’s uniformity clause, and the need to 
confront the task of interpretation openly and squarely. 
 
86 Later, the MPCP was expanded to include sectarian schools.  This version of the program 
survived a challenge under the federal Establishment Clause and analogous state constitutional 
provisions in Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wisc. 1998). 
87 WISC. CONST. art. X, § 3 (2005). 
88 Davis, 480 N.W.2d at 463. 
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C. Cases:  Florida 
 The cases from other states suggest that the Holmes court followed the wrong process in 
deciding how to define uniformity; the Florida cases suggest that the court reached the wrong 
result.  There are several widely cited Florida Supreme Court cases offering discussions of the 
uniformity clause.  These cases refer to different versions of the constitutional language, which 
has undergone several revisions over the years,89 but because the meaning of the uniformity 
requirement appears to have remained constant,90 even the earliest of these cases might have 
offered the Holmes court useful guidance.  Indeed, the court cited to some of these cases 
elsewhere in its opinion.  But because it did not incorporate these cases into its analysis of 
uniformity, the conclusion it reached diverged sharply from its own precedents. 
The earliest important case construing Florida’s uniformity clause was State ex rel. Clark 
v. Henderson.91 At issue in Clark was whether homesteads were exempted from a school tax.  In 
answering this question, the court offered a succinct statement of the purpose of the uniformity 
clause:  “The purpose intended to be accomplished in establishing and liberally maintaining a 
uniform system of public free schools, is to advance and maintain proper standards of 
enlightened citizenship.”92 Although the Clark court did not define uniformity, it indicated that 
Florida’s uniformity clause referred to a vision of uniformity something like that advanced by 
Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice Shirley Abrahamson’s dissent in Davis,93 cited above – that its 
real concern was not equal funding, or equal access, or programmatic equality, but the ability of 
public schools to transmit a coherent set of values:  those required for “enlightened citizenship.” 
 
89 See Section IV.D, infra. 
90 See 
91 188 So. 351 (Fla. 1939). 
92 Id. at 353. 
93 Davis, 480 N.W.2d 460. 
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The next major Florida case involving uniformity was School Board of Escambia County 
v. State,94 in which the Florida Supreme Court considered a claim by members of the Escambia 
County school board that a state law expanding the board’s membership violated the uniformity 
clause.  Unlike the Holmes court, the court in Escambia County lacked the benefit of much 
precedent:  the court complained of “a dearth of authority construing the significance of the 
phrase ‘uniform system of free public schools.’”95 It could identify only four decisions 
(including Clark) that addressed the meaning of this guarantee,96 and it found these decisions 
unhelpful:  “The foregoing cases advise us of variations which do not violate the uniform system 
provision ….  However, they are not particularly instructive as to which variations would run 
afoul of the constitutional directive.”97 
In the face of this ambiguity, and in reliance on the plain meaning of the word “system” 
as defined in the dictionary, the Escambia County court declared:  “By definition … a uniform 
system results when the constituent parts, although unequal in number, operate subject to a 
common plan or serve a common purpose.”  Applying this principle to the facts, the court held 
that it was not necessary for all of the state’s school boards to have the same number of 
members:  “Just as there need not be uniformity of physical plant and curriculum from county to 
county because their requirements differ, there is no compelling reason for school boards of 
 
94 353 So. 2d 834 (Fla. 1977). 
95 Id. (citing FLA. CONST. art. IX § 1).  
96 Escambia County, 353 So. 2d at 836-37 (citing State v. Holbrook, 176 So. 99 (Fla. 1937) 
(holding that a law creating tenure for Orange County teachers did not violate the uniformity 
requirement); Clark, 188 So. 351; State v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction of Pasco County, 176 So. 2d 
337 (Fla. 1965) (holding that a law creating a special school taxing district within Pasco County 
did not affect the uniformity of the system of schools); District Sch. Bd. of Lee County v. 
Askew, 278 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 1973) (holding that the state’s Minimum Foundation Program did 
not violate the uniformity clause)). 
97 Id. at 837 (citing FLA. CONST. art. IX § 1 (1968)). 
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identical size from county to county.”98 And further:  “[A]lthough equal pupil funding treatment 
… and coordinated effort and direction supplied by the State Board of Education are essential, 
identity in size of the constituent school boards is not.”99 
Thus the message of Escambia County was that local variation in programmatic 
particulars was acceptable, as long as there was a “common plan” or “common purpose.”  The 
court offered hints about what a common plan or purpose might require – centralized guidance 
and equality of “pupil funding treatment,” but not identical facilities or curricula.  But it declined 
to say “which variations would run afoul of the constitutional directive.” 
 The next major case to construe Florida’s uniformity clause was St. Johns County v. 
Northeast Florida Builders Association,100 in which the supreme court considered whether St. 
Johns County could fund new school construction by imposing an impact fee on homebuilders.  
Citing Article IX, as well as state statutory language and the “common plan or common purpose” 
language from Escambia County, the court rejected the claim that the county had violated the 
uniformity clause:  “We see nothing in this section of the constitution that mandates uniform 
sources of school funding among the several counties.”101 Then it offered a more general 
pronouncement:  “The Florida Constitution only requires that a system be provided that gives 
every student an equal chance to achieve basic educational goals prescribed by the legislature.  
The constitutional mandate is not that every school district in the state must receive equal 
funding nor that each educational program must be equivalent.”102 
98 Id. at 838. 
99 Id. 
100 583 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 1991). 
101 Id. at 641 (citing FLA. CONST. art. IX § 1 (1968); FLA. STAT. § 236.24(1) (1989); Escambia 
County, 353 So. 2d at 838). 
102 Id. 
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If the message of Escambia County was that the uniformity clause called for equality 
among school districts’ funding schemes, but not among their programmatic choices, the 
message of St. Johns County was that even this vision of uniformity was too restrictive.  Neither 
equal funding nor equivalence among “educational programs” was required.  Instead, the 
uniformity clause required only that every student be given “an equal chance to achieve basic 
educational goals.”  School districts were free to offer students this chance in a variety of ways. 
The Florida Supreme Court next discussed the uniformity clause in 1993, when it decided 
Florida Department of Education v. Glasser.103 The decision itself offered little insight about 
the meaning of uniformity, but it prefigured the Holmes court’s reluctance to offer its own 
definition.  At issue was a state law authorizing school boards to levy taxes in the absence of 
enabling legislation.  The court declined to consider the plaintiffs’ claim that the law violated the 
uniformity clause:  “The school board invites us to define ‘a uniform system of free public 
schools’ ….  We decline the invitation and leave it to the Legislature, in the first instance, to give 
content to this constitutional mandate.”104 However, perhaps sensing that a case like Holmes 
might someday arise, it observed:  “We may be required in some future case to determine 
whether the Legislature has provided ‘a uniform system,’ but we are not required to do so in the 
instant case.”105 
Though the majority in Glasser refused to define uniformity, Justice Gerald Kogan 
discussed the subject in his concurring opinion.106 Echoing prior cases, he argued that 
uniformity did not preclude flexibility:  “The uniformity clause is not and never was intended to 
require that each school district be a mirror image of every other one.  Such a goal is clearly 
 
103 622 So. 2d 944 (Fla. 1993). 
104 Id. at 947 (quoting FLA. CONST. art. IX § 1 (1968)). 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 949 (Kogan, J., specially concurring). 
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impossible on a practical level, and the constitution should not be read to require an 
impossibility.”107 And further:  “Florida law now is clear that the uniformity clause will not be 
construed as tightly restrictive, but merely as establishing a larger framework in which a broad 
degree of variation is possible.”108 Citing St. Johns County, Justice Kogan suggested that the 
touchstone was equality of student opportunity:  “[V]ariance from county to county is 
permissible so long as no district suffers a disadvantage in the basic educational opportunities 
available to its students ….”109 He even sketched a concrete application of this principle: 
[T]he mere fact that one district cannot afford to provide Latin or painting classes, 
but another can, does not create a lack of uniformity.  However, the inability of 
one district to pay for any instruction whatsoever in mathematics or language and 
writing skills would constitute a lack of uniformity ….  The Legislature cannot 
allow students in one district to be deprived of basic educational opportunities 
while students in other districts do not suffer the same.110 
Ultimately, Justice Kogan agreed with the majority that the task of defining uniformity was for 
the legislature, not the courts:  “The courts are poorly equipped to deal with the finer nuances of 
providing for uniformity.  …  Of necessity the Legislature must be given substantial leeway in 
determining how uniformity will be achieved; and the courts will intervene only where the 
Legislature clearly has failed to fulfill the constitution’s mandate.”111 
Like the court in St. Johns County, Justice Kogan suggested that the critical question, 
under the uniformity clause, was whether local school districts had given students an “equal 
chance,” and rejected the notion that programmatic uniformity was required.  But he also 
recognized the connection between programmatic uniformity and equality of opportunity.  
Where a school does not offer math courses, his opinion suggests, that is not simply a local 
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choice about curriculum – that is a constitutional violation.  Even though courts should not be in 
the business of “determining how uniformity will be achieved,” in other words, there is a limit to 
permissible programmatic variation, and cases may arise in which courts must decide exactly 
how much is too much. 
The last case, prior to Holmes, in which the Florida Supreme Court confronted the 
uniformity clause was Coalition for Adequacy and Fairness in School Funding v. Chiles.112 
Here the central issue was adequacy, not uniformity – but in contrasting the two ideas, the court 
shed light on both.  A group of plaintiffs alleged that the state had not fulfilled its constitutional 
duty to provide all students with an adequate education.  At issue was the 1968 constitution, 
which declared that “[a]dequate provision shall be made by law for a uniform system of free 
public schools ….”113 Citing separation of powers, the court declined to interpret this language 
to create a judicially enforceable right to an adequate education. 
In rejecting the plaintiffs’ claim, the court drew a contrast between the constitutional 
requirements for adequacy and uniformity.  Of the two, it said, a court was competent to apply 
only the latter:  “While the courts are competent to decide whether or not the Legislature’s 
distribution of state funds to complement local education expenditures results in the required 
‘uniform system,’ the courts cannot decide whether the Legislature’s appropriate of funds is 
adequate in the abstract, divorced from the required uniformity.”114 The question of adequacy 
was a political question, and not for a court to decide.  In this sense, adequacy stood in contrast 
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to uniformity, about which the court declared:  “the phrase ‘uniform’ has manageable standards 
because by definition this word means a lack of substantial variation.”115 
Though it seemed to describe the uniformity requirement as simpler to apply than the 
adequacy requirement, the Coalition for Adequacy court followed Escambia County, St. Johns 
County, and Glasser in rejecting the simplest possible interpretation:  “The constitutional 
mandate is not that every school district in the state must receive equal funding nor that each 
educational program must be equivalent.”116 Instead, it endorsed the language of Justice 
Kogan’s concurrence in Glasser, describing the uniformity requirement as “establishing a larger 
framework in which a broad degree of variation is possible.”117 Once again, the court 
characterized uniformity as a flexible mandate, rather than as a requirement for absolute funding 
or programmatic equality.  The new wrinkle in Coalition for Adequacy was the court’s 
apparently increased willingness to construe the term itself. 
In sum, when it decided Holmes, the Florida Supreme Court was interpreting the 
uniformity clause against a backdrop of prior cases in which it had confronted constitutional 
language that was similar, though not identical.118 Unaccountably, the court elided the sharp 
divergence between its opinion in Holmes and those it had issued previously.  Although the 
earlier Florida cases described above do not set out a clear definition of uniformity, they do 
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establish some basic parameters.  Absolute uniformity in every aspect is not required, but schools 
should provide students with equal educational opportunities, with the ultimate objective of 
“maintain[ing] proper standards of enlightened citizenship.”119 Had it examined its own 
precedent, the Holmes court would have adopted this definition, and applied it to the OSP; but it 
did not.  The earlier cases indicate, as well, that some programmatic variation among schools (as, 
for example, in curriculum) is acceptable – but it was based on exactly this sort of programmatic 
variation that the Holmes court struck down the OSP.   Finally, the earlier cases suggest that 
although the job of interpreting the uniformity clause belongs first and foremost to the 
legislature, the courts have an important role to play.  The Holmes court decided not to play this 
role openly, however, choosing instead to rule as though the term “uniform” required no 
interpretation. 
 
D. History 
Another source of potentially useful guidance for the Holmes court was the history of 
Florida’s uniformity clause.  Blackstone wrote that “the most universal and effectual way of 
discovering the true meaning of a law, when the words are dubious, is by considering the reason 
and spirit of it; or the cause which moved the legislator to enact it.”120 More than two centuries 
later, though less optimistic about its efficacy, Richard Posner echoed Blackstone’s endorsement 
of historical interpretation:  “[w]hen confronting unclear statutes, judges, like junior officers 
confronting unclear commands, have to summon all their powers of imagination and empathy, in 
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an effort – doomed to frequent failure – to place themselves in the position of the legislators who 
enacted the statute that they are being asked to interpret.”121 
The historical approach was available to the Holmes court, since “courts [in Florida] look 
to the legislative history of the provision and statements by the drafters and adopters in 
interpreting a constitutional provision.”122 Elsewhere, the Holmes court seemed to embrace 
historicism; its opinion includes a history of Florida’s education article, taken as a whole. 123 But 
the court did not look to this history in deciding how to interpret the word “uniform.”  Had it 
done so, it might have seen that its literal reading of the uniformity clause was inconsistent, not 
only with its own precedent, but also with the drafters’ intent.  It might have seen that the word 
“uniform,” as understood by the people who added it to Florida’s organic law, refers not simply 
to programmatic uniformity, but to the idea that public schools should prepare all students 
equally for citizenship in a democracy. 
The uniformity clause construed by the court in Holmes was quite new – it was the 
product of a 1998 constitutional amendment124 – but the Florida constitution has required 
uniformity in public education for nearly 150 years.  As the Holmes court pointed out, the first 
Florida constitution, adopted in 1838, contained an education article,125 but the idea of 
uniformity first appeared in 1868, with the addition of a provision requiring “a uniform system of 
Common Schools.”126 In 1885, an amendment replaced this language with the requirement that 
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“[t]he Legislature shall provide for a uniform system of public free schools.”127 Next, a 1968 
revision declared, “Adequate provision shall be made by law for a uniform system of free public 
schools ….”128 Finally, an amendment passed in 1998 added the language at issue in Holmes:
“Adequate provision shall be made by law for a uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high quality 
system of free public schools ….”129 
As this account demonstrates, despite numerous amendments to Florida’s education 
article, the language of its uniformity requirement has changed only slightly over the past 
century and a half, suggesting that the notion of uniformity articulated by that requirement has 
remained essentially the same.  Moreover, the intent of the 1998 revision was not to alter the 
uniformity requirement:  “The intention of the [Constitution Revision Commission] … was not 
to modify Florida’s already satisfactory uniformity requirement.”130 Its objective, instead, was 
“to allow the people of [Florida], through the Constitution, its document, to instruct its state 
government that its paramount duty is to provide an adequate … education for its children.”131 
In interpreting the uniformity clause, therefore, the Holmes court should have examined its 
origins in the state’s 1868 constitution.132 
In 1868, and indeed for much of the nineteenth century, American thinking on the subject 
of education reform was dominated by the common schools movement.  Horace Mann, often 
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hailed as the movement’s father, claimed that its goal was to unite Americans:  “The spread of 
education, by enlarging the cultivated class or caste, will open a wider area over which the social 
feelings will expand; and, if this education should be universal and complete, it would do more 
than all things else to obliterate factitious distinctions in society.”133 More recent commentators 
have suggested that the common schools movement sought to achieve this goal by instilling in 
students a common set of understandings about morality, religion, citizenship, and work.  Writes 
Carl Kaestle:  “Common schools … trained children to be good citizens, they developed moral 
character and work habits, they drew people into a common culture based on native Protestant 
ideology, they spread literacy, and they offered opportunities for individual advancement.”134 
Lawrence Cremin offers a similar account: 
The school performed many functions:  it provided youngsters with an 
opportunity to become literate … ; it offered youngsters a common belief system 
combining undenominational Protestantism and nonpartisan patriotism; it 
afforded youngsters an elementary familiarity with … some rules of life at the 
level of the maxim and proverb; it introduced youngsters to an organized 
subsociety other than the household and church that observed such norms as 
punctuality, achievement, competitiveness, fair play, merit, and respect for adult 
authority ….135 
In many cases, the common schools advocates’ insistence on inculcating children with Protestant 
values reflected deep prejudice against other faiths, especially Catholicism.  Writes Diane 
Ravitch:  “The rise of the American common school during the nineteenth century cannot be 
understood without reference to the dominant influence of evangelical Protestantism in their 
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formation and, more specifically, to the relentless efforts by evangelical Protestants to deny 
public funds to Catholic schools.”136 For good or ill, the common schools movement 
incorporated a deep desire for cultural uniformity:  “[T]he anxiety about cultural heterogeneity 
propelled the establishment of systems of public education; from the very beginning public 
schools became agents of cultural standardization.”137 
Several factors point to the conclusion that the drafters of Florida’s 1868 constitution 
were influenced by the common school movement.  The first, and most obvious, is the language 
of the constitution itself, which requires the state to maintain “a uniform system of Common 
Schools.”138 A second factor is the timing of its adoption.  During the antebellum period, the 
proponents of common schooling were less successful in the southern states than in the Northeast 
and the Midwest.139 But by 1868, their ideas were gaining widespread support:  “[C]ommon-
school reform became less controversial after 1860 and … there was an expanding consensus 
around its ideology.”140 Third, and most importantly, the 1868 education article exemplifies a 
broader trend during the Reconstruction era toward remaking antebellum Southern schooling on 
the common school model. 
Florida’s 1868 constitution is an artifact of Radical Reconstruction.  The state had 
adopted a constitution only three years previously, in 1865, but this document had denied 
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suffrage to all but white men, and Congress had refused to accept it.141 In 1867, following the 
second occupation of Florida by the federal military, black and white Floridians voted together to 
elect delegates to a new convention.  Of forty-six delegates to the 1868 constitutional 
convention, eighteen were African Americans.142 Although one contemporary observer has 
described the 1868 convention as “a tumultuous and schismatic affair,”143 it produced a 
document largely free of the 1865 constitution’s egregious flaws.144 
Few differences between the 1868 constitution and its predecessor were as stark as that 
between their provisions for public education.  Whereas the 1865 constitution had included only 
“minimal and weak provisions for public education,” the 1868 provisions were “highly specific 
and strong.”145 The substance of the 1865 education article was that “[t]he proceeds of all lands 
for the use of schools and a seminary or seminaries of learning shall be and remain a perpetual 
fund.”146 This 1868 version, by contrast, not only required the state to establish a “uniform 
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system of common schools,” but also declared that “[i]t is the paramount duty of the State to 
make ample provision for the education of the children residing within its borders, without 
distinction or preference.”147 
The transformation of Florida’s education article was typical of a wider process, enacted 
by black and white reformers in coalition, by which “the haphazard and halting constitutional 
provisions for education in the antebellum South were transformed into elaborate legal 
frameworks for universal public schooling ….”148 In carrying out this transformation, Southern 
reformers drew on the ideas of the common school movement:  “In Radical Reconstruction 
conventions, blacks pressed for modern common schools modeled on the best Northern state 
systems.”149 Their efforts reflected the desire of newly free black citizens to ensure that their 
children would receive a free public education.150 They embraced not only the notion of 
universal free public education, but also the belief that a key objective of schooling was to 
prepare students to be good citizens:  “The educational provisions of those Radical 
Reconstruction constitutions and the debates on education in the conventions reveal how 
passionately the freedmen and their white allies believed in the traditional ideology that linked 
schooling and republican citizenship.”151 In later years, whites recaptured political control and 
forced black Southerners into second-class schools.  But the institutional changes the reformers 
 
147 FLA. CONST. art. IX, §§ 1-2 (1868). 
148 James D. Anderson, Black Rural Communities and the Struggle for Education During the Age 
of Booker T. Washington, 67 PEABODY J. EDUC. 46, 50 (1990). 
149 Tyack & Lowe, supra note 145, at 238. 
150 Anderson, supra note 148, at 48 (observing that “[f]ew values and aspirations were more 
firmly rooted in the freedmen’s culture than education.”).
151 Id. 
43 
had wrought survived, as the resurgent whites “kept the central features of educational 
governance and finance created by [the new] constitutions.”152 
Had it looked to history, therefore, the Holmes court would have seen that the reformers 
who drafted Florida’s uniformity clause, influenced by the common school movement and acting 
as part of a larger Reconstruction-era trend toward the enactment of constitutional guarantees of 
universal schooling, had more in mind than programmatic uniformity.  Their primary goal was 
not that all schools should use the same instructional techniques, but that all schools should 
prepare students for enlightened citizenship.  Only by overlooking history was the Holmes court 
able to construe the uniformity clause as referring merely to programmatic uniformity. 
It is important to point out, as Justice Kogan did in his Glasser dissent, that in any 
education reform movement, programmatic and ideological elements are linked.  Even as the 
common school reformers used modern instructional techniques to advance their ideological 
objectives, they exploited the broad appeal of their ideology to advance their programmatic 
goals:  “Essayists, state superintendents, and local school committees continually coupled their 
specific reform proposals with a repetition of the unassailable social functions of common 
schooling.”153 It must be acknowledged, as well, that the common school reformers admired 
centralization and consistency.  Early adherents of the movement in Massachusetts were 
motivated not only by a desire to teach students citizenship but also by a desire to bring order to 
a chaotic system.  One historian notes that when Horace Mann assumed charge of the 
Massachusetts schools, “[t]he need for reform … was urgent ….  [I]n two thirds of the towns 
teachers were allowed to begin their schools without being certificated as required by law.  There 
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was a confusion of textbooks, and one third of the children were absent from school in winter 
….”154 
But the common schools reformers’ interest in programmatic uniformity was tempered 
by their respect for local variation: 
Reformers coupled the drive for [graded schools] with a desire to see more 
uniformity in classroom programs.  They did not want lock-step conformity, to be 
sure.  They were for innovation, change, and the adaptation of schools to local 
circumstances; but they also thought that there were desirable standards of quality 
and that consistency was a virtue.155 
A case in point is the campaign among some nineteenth-century Florida educators for uniform 
textbooks: 
In the mid and later 1800’s Florida school men and parents were harassed by 
many problems about textbooks:  pupils might come to school with no textbooks 
or each might come with a different one.  With the demand for “graded” schools 
such conditions made the teacher’s work an impossibility.  During this period 
state superintendents repeatedly urged statewide uniformity of texts.156 
Even some of the delegates to the 1868 constitutional convention favored textbook uniformity.  
Delegate Jonathan C. Gibbs, who later became Florida’s first black cabinet secretary, “had 
moderate success in securing adoption of uniform texts in elementary and secondary schools.”157 
But the campaigners for textbook uniformity did not necessarily want statewide uniformity; they 
only wished to have all the schools in each county use the same textbooks.  The first Florida law 
on this subject, passed in 1883, demanded uniformity only at the county level; Florida did not 
enact a law requiring statewide uniformity until 1911, and this requirement lasted only until 
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1937.158 Thus the purpose of the campaign for textbook uniformity was not forcing all Florida’s 
students to march in “lock-step.”  It was remedying an essentially anarchic state of affairs, in 
order that teachers could teach.  Once that purpose was achieved, county school boards were free 
to innovate. 
More importantly, although the common schools reformers admired consistency, it was 
not the core purpose of their movement.  The invitation to the 1839 convention of the American 
Lyceum, a nineteenth century education reform society associated with the common school 
movement, reflected its priorities: 
[The common] schools therefore must be with us the hope of civilization, liberty 
and virtue.  To elevate them so as to meet the wants of our republic is the high 
and single aim of the convention.  …  [The convention’s] deliberations and 
results, when published to the country, will bring the great cause of Education 
simultaneously before the several states in a form for enlightened, definite and 
successful action.  As subservient to this humane and patriotic object we would 
suggest a few among the many topics which will demand the consideration of the 
meeting:  viz. … What is the organization of the school system?  What branches 
of knowledge should be taught in our common schools?  What should be the 
character of our common school books? … What should be the qualifications of 
teachers?159 
The common school reformers were interested in curriculum, and textbooks, and teacher 
qualifications, in other words – but those considerations were subservient to the principal goal of 
schooling:  meeting the wants of the republic.  Here is a blunter formulation of their goals, 
offered by the Illinois superintendent of public instruction in 1862:  “The chief end is to make 
GOOD CITIZENS.  Not to make precocious scholars … not to impart the secret of acquiring 
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wealth … not to qualify directly for professional success … but simply to make good 
citizens.”160 
The same priorities appear to underlie the first law passed by the Florida Legislature 
implementing the 1868 constitution’s education article.  Passed in 1869, the law does not 
command teachers to use any particular mode of instruction; instead, it commands them to carry 
out the core mission of the common school – that is, to teach students the values of citizenship: 
Each teacher is hereby directed and authorized … [t]o labor faithfully and 
earnestly for the advancement of the pupils in their studies, deportment, and 
morals, and embrace every opportunity to inculcate, by precept and example, the 
principles of Truth, Honesty, Patriotism, and the practice of every Christian virtue 
… to cultivate in them habits of industry and economy, a regard for the rights and 
feelings of others, and their own responsibilities and duties as citizens.161 
Moreover, in describing the duties of school boards, the law permits substantial programmatic 
latitude.  It instructs school boards “[t]o do whatever they may judge expedient with regard to … 
procuring the proper apparatus, text-books for the schools, books and stationery for the teachers’ 
use; grading and classifying the pupils, and providing separate schools for the different classes in 
such manner as will secure the largest attendance of pupils, promote harmony and advancement 
of the school ….”162 The 1869 Florida legislature was in a position to assess accurately the 
intent of a constitutional provision adopted in 1868.  Indeed, some of its members had been 
delegates at the convention.163 Its decision to emphasize ideology over program in its 
implementation of the provision suggests a like intent on the part of the provision’s drafters. 
In the end, it is possible that drafters of Florida’s uniformity clause contemplated not only 
that Florida’s schools would provide all students a uniform opportunity for enlightened 
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citizenship, but also that they would do so through uniform methods.  But the language of the 
clause and the circumstances of its adoption should have been a signal to the Holmes court that 
its drafters intended it to do much more than guarantee that all Florida’s children received 
instruction based on the Sunshine State Standards and delivered by teachers on whom the state 
had performed background checks.  The drafters might even have approved of programmatic 
requirements like these, but they would have seen such requirements as a means, rather than as 
an end.  Their question about the OSP would not have been, does it cause the state of Florida to 
fund schools that deviate from the Sunshine State Standards?  Their question would have been, 
does the OSP deliver state funding to schools that fail to prepare students equally for enlightened 
citizenship?  Does the OSP defeat the purpose of public education?  Does the OSP tear at the 
fabric of society?  These questions – much more difficult, and much more important – are the 
ones the Holmes court should have confronted. 
 
E. Application 
 Had it discovered that the purpose of the uniformity clause is to see that all Florida’s 
children have an equal opportunity to attain enlightened citizenship, the Holmes court would 
have faced one final task:  applying its discovery to the evidence.  Did the OSP frustrate the 
state’s effort to fulfill this purpose?  The claim is not unreasonable.  The primary tension 
between Florida’s uniformity clause, properly understood, and the OSP – indeed, between 
uniformity clauses and school voucher programs generally – is that where the uniformity clause 
commands the state to educate students for citizenship, a voucher devotes public funds to schools 
that may educate students for other purposes.  A voucher program may do more than fund 
schools that use diverse curricula, or hire teachers with diverse qualifications, in other words; it 
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may fund schools that seek to produce students with diverse values.  Even the very first school 
voucher proposals were sensitive to the concern that such diversity might be harmful.  Milton 
Friedman, in perhaps the first-ever proposal for a school voucher scheme, acknowledged that 
“[o]ne argument … for nationalizing education is that it might otherwise be impossible to 
provide the common core of values deemed requisite for social stability.”164 If the OSP impeded 
the state’s efforts to provide students with a “common core of values,” then the Holmes court 
was right to strike it down.  Neither the statute itself nor the available evidence appears to 
support this conclusion, however. 
In applying the uniformity clause to the OSP, the Holmes court examined the statute 
authorizing the program, as it should have done.  Although the court focused on the law’s ability 
to provide for programmatic uniformity, rather than the more ideological brand of uniformity 
intended by the constitution, some of the provisions it singled out for criticism raise legitimate 
concerns about the law’s constitutionality.  Weak programmatic controls, on their face, would 
not have violated the uniformity clause – but they might have produced violations by preventing 
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values will be more reliably and effectively conveyed by schools that reflect particular moral and 
religious worldviews than by schools run by the government.”). 
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the state from carrying out its constitutional duty.  For example, the court criticized the 
requirement that voucher schools be subject to “instruction, curriculum, and attendance criteria” 
that were selected, not by the state, but by “an appropriate nonpublic school accrediting body.”165 
Perhaps the absence of a requirement for state accreditation deprived the state of the power to 
supervise OSP schools adequately.  The Holmes court also suggested that provisions absent from 
the OSP statute should have been included.  For example, as noted above, the statute does not 
require OSP schools to use the state curriculum, which instructs public schools to teach students 
about the “essentials of the United States Constitution,” and “the elements of civil 
government.”166 Perhaps the OSP impermissibly weakened Florida’s ability to ensure that all 
students received instruction in these essential areas. 
The problem with these arguments is that none of them states a violation of the 
uniformity clause; instead, each describes a situation that might have permitted a violation, 
depending on how the state education department implemented the statute.  Did the absence of 
requirements for state accreditation and certain forms of civics instruction compromise the 
state’s ability to satisfy the uniformity requirement?  Or did the state supervise the private 
accreditation process adequately, and insist that students receive instruction in “the elements of 
civil government,” perhaps relying on the statute’s apparent invitation to exercise discretion in 
determining which private school accrediting organizations were “appropriate”?  The available 
evidence does not say, and the court does not ask.  Moreover, though the court chooses not to 
focus on them, the statute does contain safeguards against potential violations.  It requires 
 
165 FLA. STAT. § 1002.38(4)(f) (2005).  The court points out that these accrediting bodies have 
“widely variant quality standards and program requirements.”  Holmes III, 919 So. 2d 392 
(quoting Fla. Dep’t of Educ., Private School Accreditation, at
http://www.floridaschoolchoice.org/Information/Private_Schools/accreditation.asp (last visited 
Apr. 18, 2006)). 
166 Holmes III, 919 So. 2d at 410. 
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schools participating in the OSP to comply with antidiscrimination law,167 to “[a]ccept 
scholarship students on an entirely random and religious-neutral basis,”168 and to “[a]gree not to 
compel any student attending the private school on an opportunity scholarship to profess a 
specific ideological belief, to pray, or to worship.”169 In the end, the OSP does not seem to 
constitute a facial violation of the uniformity clause. 
The next logical question for the Holmes court, at this point, was whether the OSP was 
unconstitutional as implemented by the state.  As noted above, researchers have examined the 
effects of the OSP on students’ academic performance, with conflicting results.170 But little 
evidence exists to indicate whether the OSP harmed the ability of Florida’s schools to teach 
citizenship. Certainly little such evidence was before the court.  The only party even to address 
the issue was Ruth Holmes, the named plaintiff, who argued that the goals of the private schools 
participating in the OSP were antithetical to the goal of the uniformity clause.  Of the private 
schools, she observed:  “Discovery taken of the four sectarian schools … makes clear that 
religious indoctrination is an integral part of the schools’ educational programs.  The Diocese 
itself identifies as one of the ‘goals’ of its schools to ‘inculcate in each student a strong spirit of 
faith in the message of Jesus …’”171 Citing Clark, Holmes contrasted this goal with the purpose 
of Florida’s public schools, as expressed by the drafters of the uniformity clause:  “[T]he framers 
recognized the important role the common schools play in preparing citizens to function in a free 
society – both through a curriculum that teaches the responsibilities of citizenship, and through 
 
167 FLA. STAT. § 1002.38(3)(c) (2005). 
168 FLA. STAT. § 1002.38(3)(e) (2005). 
169 FLA. STAT. § 1002.38(4)(j) (2005). 
170 See Section III.B, supra.
171 Holmes III, 929 So. 2d 392, Answer Brief of Ruth Holmes, at 3. 
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the formal interaction and socialization of children from diverse walks of life.172 If Holmes’s 
suspicions are correct, and the religious schools participating in the program were proselytizing 
among voucher students, the program did indeed violate the uniformity clause – but the evidence 
here seems too thin to permit the conclusion that it did so. 
Not having found conclusive evidence about the OSP’s effect on citizenship education, 
the Holmes court might have looked to empirical data on other voucher programs, as well as on 
other forms of school choice.  Here, too, most of the available data bear on questions other than 
whether such programs advance citizenship education.173 But there are a few potentially useful 
sources the court might have consulted.  First, as a general matter, many educational researchers 
have argued that schools need not – indeed, should not – adopt the same programmatic approach 
in order to pursue the same goal.  Summarizing a study of state-level education reforms, 
education historians David Tyack and Larry Cuban write:  “[E]xcellence cannot be coerced.  At 
best, laws and rules might create some necessary but not sufficient conditions under which 
competent and caring teachers and intellectually curious students might flourish.”174 As a 
sensible alternative to “lock-step” reform, Tyack and Cuban suggest that “[i]nstead of being 
ready-made plans, reform policies could be stated as principles, general aims, to be modified in 
the light of experience, and embodied in practices that vary by school or even by classroom.”175 
More recent research confirms the effectiveness of this approach in the school choice context.  
For example, a recent study five charter schools operated by KIPP, a private organization, found 
that “[f]rom classroom work to student behavior, all five Bay Area KIPP schools have translated 
 
172 Id. at 10 (citing Clark, 188 So. at 353). 
173 See Section III.B, supra.
174 DAVID TYACK & LARRY CUBAN, TINKERING TOWARD UTOPIA: A CENTURY OF PUBLIC 
SCHOOL REFORM 80 (1995) (citing THOMAS R. TIMAR & DAVID L. KIRP, MANAGING 
EDUCATIONAL EXCELLENCE (1988)). 
175 Id. at 83. 
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high expectations into actions with visible results.”176 The schools reached this result by 
insisting on a core ideology, while permitting a significant degree of programmatic flexibility:  
“[T]he five schools differ significantly along several dimensions including student body 
composition, style of leadership and teaching, and the ways in which they implement different 
aspects of the KIPP model”.177 
The Holmes court also might have consulted existing studies on the effects of school 
choice schemes on schools’ ability to teach “civic values” (e.g., political participation and 
patriotism).  In a meta-analysis of nineteen such studies, Patrick J. Wolf of Georgetown 
University found that “[s]ixteen of the studies concluded that school choice and private 
schooling generally enhance the democratic values of students; whereas the remaining three 
studies found no difference in democratic values caused by school choice.”178 Wolf concluded:  
“School vouchers … appear to promote democratic values.”179 His findings suggest not merely 
that the OSP was unlikely to have damaged Florida’s ability to educate its children for 
citizenship, but that it may have enhanced the state’s ability to achieve that goal. 
Finally, the Holmes court could have examined the effect of school choice schemes on 
racial and economic integration.  Though distinct from questions about schools’ ability to teach 
citizenship, this question is closely related, since policies that increase integration may help 
students from different racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic groups learn to communicate with and 
 
176 JANE L. DAVID ET AL., BAY AREA KIPP SCHOOLS: A STUDY OF EARLY IMPLEMENTATION ES-
1 (2006), available at http://www.sri.com/policy/cep/pubs/choice/KIPPYear1Report.pdf (last 
visited Apr. 17, 2006). 
177 Id. at 69. 
178 Patrick J. Wolf, Testimony Before the Texas House Select Committee on Public School 
Finance, Subcommittee on Alternative Methods (Aug. 22, 2003), available at 
http://www.texaspolicy.com/pdf/2003-08-22-SFSC-Wolfe-testimony.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 
2006).  
179 Id. 
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respect one another – essential capacities for citizens in a diverse society.  After analyzing the 
effects of the District of Columbia’s voucher program, researchers Jay Greene and Marcus 
Winters reported that “voucher-accepting private schools have racial populations that better 
resemble the racial composition of the surrounding metro area [than do the populations of 
corresponding public schools] and are less likely to have student populations that are racially 
homogenous.”180 Along the same lines, a 2002 report of the American Education Reform 
Council found that participants in voucher programs in Milwaukee and Cleveland were less 
racially isolated than their nonparticipating peers.181 Some evidence does indicate that school 
choice program decreases integration.  In an examination of a school choice program in New 
Zealand, for example, Helen Ladd and Edward Fiske found “polarization of enrollment by 
ethnicity and economic advantage.”182 But here, again, most of the available data appear to 
suggest that school choice programs like the OSP are likely to enhance, rather than damaging, 
students’ opportunities to become enlightened citizens. 
In sum:  Neither the statute itself, nor the available evidence, indicates clearly that the 
Opportunity Scholarship Program violated Florida’s uniformity clause.  The statute contains 
provisions that are potentially concerning, and others that offer some reassurance, but does not 
 
180 Jay P. Greene & Marcus A. Winters, An Evaluation of the Effect of D.C.’s Voucher Program 
on Public School Achievement and Racial Integration After One Year 8 (Education Working 
Paper No. 10, Jan. 2006), available at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/ewp_10.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 31, 2006). 
181 Howard L. Fuller & Deborah Greiveldinger, The Impact of School Choice on Racial 
Integration in Milwaukee Private Schools, American Education Reform Council (Aug. 2002), at
www.schoolchoiceinfo.org/data/research/integ0802.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2006). 
182 Helen Ladd & Edward B. Fiske, Does Competition Generate Better Schools? Evidence From 
New Zealand 10 (Terry Sanford Institute of Public Policy Working Paper No. SAN01-16, July 
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violate the uniformity clause on its face.  Nor is there sufficient evidence to say with confidence 
whether the state’s implementation of the OSP violated the constitutional mandate.  Meanwhile, 
the available data on voucher and school choice programs in other states tilt against the 
conclusion that such programs impede citizenship education.  Having reviewed this evidence, the 
Holmes court might have remarked on what appears to be an urgent need for more data.  It might 
even have upheld the OSP on the theory that, if all such programs are struck down, their effects 
will never be known.  But it should not have held that the OSP violated the uniformity clause. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
As noted in the Introduction to this Article, the Holmes case was closely watched by 
policymakers, legislators, and educators from across the nation.  Some have speculated, since the 
court struck down the Opportunity Scholarship Program, that Holmes heralded the demise not 
only of similar programs in Florida (e.g., the McKay Scholarship Program for disabled children), 
but also of school choice initiatives in other states.183 
To the extent that other courts interpreting state constitutional uniformity clauses consult 
the Holmes opinion for guidance, however, those courts should view the Florida Supreme 
Court’s approach as an example of what not to do.  Although the meaning of “uniform” is not 
self-evident, the court failed to acknowledge the necessity of choosing from among the many 
possible meanings.  In crafting its own definition, it ignored its own precedents on the subject, as 
well as relevant historical evidence.  It selected a simplistic, literal definition that is indefensible 
on doctrinal or historical grounds.  And it used that definition to strike down a program that 
appears not to have violated the core objective of Florida’s uniformity clause. 
 
183 See, e.g., Coulson, supra note 3. 
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This Article does not advance a normative claim about how future uniformity clause 
challenges to school choice programs should come out.  It does argue, however, that courts 
hearing such challenges should eschew the Holmes court’s approach in favor of the four-part 
approach outlined above:  1) acknowledge the necessity of choosing a definition of the term 
“uniform”; 2) consult all available sources of guidance, including case law and historical 
sources; 3) choose a definition that reflects this guidance; and 4) apply this definition both to the 
statute and to available empirical data. 
Whether remedying the Holmes court’s errors would have changed the outcome of the 
case is beyond the scope of this Article; had the court not found a uniformity clause violation, it 
might have struck down the OSP on other grounds.  If the court’s uniformity clause analysis 
determined its outcome, of course, it is especially regrettable.  In that case, the court needlessly 
and unfairly terminated a program that appeared to confer substantial benefits on several hundred 
schoolchildren, while not violating the state constitution.  But even if the court would have 
struck down the OSP on other grounds, its flawed decision worked a significant harm, in that it 
confused our national conversation about school vouchers and other forms of school choice. 
The question whether school choice programs are compatible with the traditional 
common school model is enormously important.  On one hand, such programs represent the 
cutting edge of school reform.  On the other hand, even in states that do not have uniformity 
requirements, the common school model is widely understood to be the philosophical foundation 
on which our entire system of public education rests.  Determining whether school choice and 
common schools can be reconciled – or, if not, which of them should yield – will require a 
thoughtful and sustained process of national deliberation.  Presented with an opportunity to 
advance this process, the Holmes court ducked.  State courts presented with future uniformity 
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clause challenges to voucher programs and other school choice schemes should confront them 
honestly and squarely. 
 
